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                                                 BOOK REVIEW1
Cushing, James T., Philosophical Concepts in Physics. The Historical Relation
Between Philosophy and Scientific Theories, Cambridge University Press, 1998, xix +
424 pp.
This book successfully achieves to serve two different purposes. On the one hand, it is
a readable physics-based introduction into the philosophy of science, written in an
informal and accessible style. The author, himself a professor of physics at the
University of Notre Dame and active in the philosophy of science for almost twenty
years, carefully develops his metatheoretical arguments on a solid basis provided by
an extensive survey along the lines of the historical development of physics. On the
other hand, this book supplies one long argument for Cushing´s own attitude in the
philosophy of science. While former studies of the author, from which this book draws
in part, focused each on one special episode in the history of science, this book gathers
case material from many different parts of physics and epochs. The main goal of this
book is ”to impress upon the reader the essential and ineliminable role that
philosophical considerations have played in the actual practice of science” (p. xv).
The book is beautifully edited and produced; it contains a wealth of illustrative figures,
well-chosen short quotations from original sources and contemporary commentators
(some longer quotations are relegated in an appendix at the end of a chapter) and does
not dispense with insightful mathematical arguments in the main text (some advanced
deductions are, however, relegated in the appendices). It contains nine parts, whereas
only the first and the last one are exclusively devoted to philosophical issues. The
seven remaining parts, each subdivided into three chapters, centre around one major
episode (a theory, a world view, etc.) in the history of physics. The author presents this
material in a clear and philosophically unbiased way so that also readers who do not
share Cushing’s subsequent philosophical conclusions will find this inspiring book
extremely useful.
Part 1 (”The scientific enterprise”) discusses some traditional (”objectivist”) views
concerning the status of scientific knowledge, ”the” scientific method, and the relation
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between metaphysics and science. In this context, the relevant work of Aristotle, F.
Bacon, R. Descartes, D. Hume, and - as a representative of our century - K. Popper is
examined and several methodological strategies (such as inductivism, the hypothetico-
deductive method, and falsificationism) are introduced. All of these strategies seem to
play some role in the actual practice of science.
Part 2 (”Ancient and modern models of the universe”) gives a careful account of some
early Greek cosmological considerations and of the Ptolemaic and Copernican model
of the universe in the light of the observational evidence of that time. Furthermore the
once highly influential ”impetus theory” and Galileis theory of motion is discussed.
Cushing shows in detail why Galilei could never have performed his famous Leaning
Tower of Pisa experiment. This is one of several examples where Cushing points out
wrong accounts of the history of physics in many physics textbooks. Other examples
for this phenomenon, to be discussed in later chapters, are Planck’s work on the black
body radiation, Bohrs’s original way to his atomic model, and Maxwell’s actual
reasoning that lead him to postulate the existence of the displacement current.
Part 3 (”The Newtonian universe”) introduces some of the arguments I. Newton’s
develops in his influential treatise Principia. Cushing explains in detail what role
Kepler’s laws played for the construction of Newton’s theory and, as an illustration,
how the ocean tides can be explained with this theory.
Part 4 (”A perspective”) presents the world view of Newtonian physics, elaborated by
Newton’s successors. Special emphasis is given to an analysis of the concept of
determinism. Cushing shows how this concept emerged from a bold extrapolation of
an investigation of a few special force functions and the application of perturbation
theory for many body systems. Since modern chaos theory established that
determinism does not imply predictability, Cushing suggests that there is no way to
decide if classical systems are deterministic or indeterministic. This interesting
thought, of course, presupposes Cushing’s empiricist assumption that such decisions
can only be made on the basis of observations. This part also contains an informative
discussion of the well-known dispute between G. Galilei and the church. Cushing
points out what role evidence as well as the different characters of the relevant
dramatis personae and other social factors played in this conflict.
Part 5 (”Mechanical versus electrodynamical world views”) presents a challenge for
the world view associated with Newtonian physics. Cushing discusses various
mechanical models of the electromagnetic aether and Maxwell’s theory. This part also
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contains an illuminating analysis of data on the variation of the electron mass with
velocity in the light of rival theories of the electron obtained in experiments performed
by W. Kaufmann in the first decade of this century. Cushing shows in detail how the
hypotheses in question are embedded in a web of background assumptions and
concludes that ”the Kaufmann experiment [...] did not act as a definitive and deciding
(`crucial´) experiment in the sense that a strict falsificationist view of science would
lead one to expect” (p. 220). This kind of argument is a general feature of this book.
Cushing establishes that a certain position in the philosophy of science that is
essentially a result of logical considerations does not agree with the actual practice of
science. Unfortunately, Cushing often presents only dummy positions that no one
holds any more (such as ”strict” falsificationism (p. 366) or certain criteria of
confirmation (p. 369)). G. Andersson, for example, shows in his vigorous defence of
falsificationism that episodes like the analysis of the Kaufmann experiment fit well in
this metatheoretical scheme (see G. Andersson, <English title etc.>, sec. 8.2).
Part 6 (”The theory of relativity”) gives an overview of Einstein’s special and general
theory of relativity. At the end of the chapter Cushing presents a world view based on
general relativity. Quite surprisingly, Cushing missed to mention in this context the
current discussion of determinism in general relativity and the recurrent theme of the
underdetermination of geometry by evidence. A discussion of these issues could have
supplemented his respective views developed in part 8.
Part 7 (”The quantum world and the completeness of quantum mechanics”) provides
an account of the development of quantum mechanics and a careful analysis of the role
of the famous inequalities first derived by J. Bell. Furthermore, this part contains a
lucid exposition of the measurement problem, the single big problem for many
interpreters of quantum mechanics, and a reconstruction of the famous debate between
N. Bohr and A. Einstein.
Part 8 (”Some philosophical lessons from quantum mechanics”) continues the
discussion of quantum mechanics with an analysis of the EPR paper and the
exposition of an alternative to the standard (”Copenhagen”) interpretation of quantum
mechanics. This alternative interpretation, first suggested by D. Bohm in 1952,
supports a radically different ontology while, according to the author, being
empirically indistinguishable from the standard version. More specifically, Cushing
argues that the Bohm theory uses the same formalism as the Copenhagen theory, but
differs in the interpretation of this formalism. From this several conclusions are
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drawn. Firstly, ”the best theory we have” is underdetermined by data. Secondly, this
situation implies that on the basis of observation alone, the choice between
determinism and indeterminism cannot be decided conclusively. Thirdly, this
diagnosis raises a serious problem for the scientific realist, since observation does not
rule out one of two ontologically quite different theories. If one accepts Cushing’s
exposition, one may nevertheless wonder, if there aren’t any other (”soft”) criteria to
identify the ”true” theory. We shall come back to the role and status Cushing attributes
to them later. One may, however, also doubt that both ”interpretations” (cf. M.
Jammer’s usage of this term) are indeed empirically indistinguishable. After all,
Bohm’s theory has an additional equation of motion for the particles’ trajectories that
may eventually produce new empirical consequences. In this case, Cushing would
have lost his main argument for actual underdetermination in science and against
scientific realism. It should be noted, however, that Cushing does not primarily intend
to defend an elaborated philosophical position in this book. Nevertheless, several
positive claims can be identified (see Part 9):
1. Science is a ”coupled network” of practice, methods, and goals. None of these
levels is immune to change, ”either in principle or in fact” (372 f). This means, for
example, that there is no fixed methodology (such as Popper’s). In fact, scientists
happen to be opportunists; in order to solve scientific problems they are willing to
provisionally accept any philosophical (or whatsoever) position or methodology
that might help.
2. The development of scientific theories is, like any other cultural activity,
accompanied by the occurrence of historically contingent factors. By telling a
fascinating story of counterfactual history, Cushing shows that the development of
modern physical theory (quantum theory) could well have developed quite
differently. This demonstrates that (at least one) important scientific theory is in
fact underdetermined by data.
3. In order to select one theory over another, scientists have to apply soft criteria,
such as simplicity. These criteria, however, have some uneliminable subjective
component and are therefore not suited to identify the ”true” theory. The only real
criteria are the ”hard” ones: empirical adequacy and logical consistency. But they
do not uniquely determine the wanted theory.
Another important weak criterion for theory selection is understandability. This concept
is notoriously hard to explicate. Cushing criticises the `standard view´ that
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understanding can be equated with unification or reduction. He maintains that
understanding has also something to do with visualizability and the existence of a causal
story. The discussion of the EPR-correlations shows that scientists are not completely
satisfied with theories that are empirically adequate and provide formal explanations,
but do not produce any real understanding whatsoever. The Copenhagen-Bohm case
shows, however, that understandable theories (such as the Bohm theory) are not always
preferred.
At least as noticeable as these positive claims is way of doing philosophy of science
Cushing implicitly suggests and demonstrates in this book. The author supports a
naturalistic and interdisciplinary approach to science, history, and philosophy (”it
takes a lot of history of science to anchor even a little philosophy of science” (xv)). He
points out, for example, that it does not suffice to restrict oneself to the business of
reconstructing already successful theories (”Whig-history”). Philosophers of science
have to go beyond the textbook level and examine the whole (philosophical, historical,
sociological, etc.) culture in which theories are constructed. This approach is
descriptive, not prescriptive. Cushing has shown that it nevertheless leads to
interesting insights. For good reasons Cushing does not provide another overall
philosophical account of science, but he does a lot to increase our understanding of
what science is and how it really functions.
  Stephan Hartmann
